The naive view of electronic voting is that it is simply
the automation of the well-understood process of voting - namely
people make choices and those choices are recorded, counted and
processed to create a result. The introduction of electronic
equipment, as advocates of e-voting see it, does not alter the
process of voting aside from making it faster and more accurate.
Unfortunately this view is flawed - pure electronic voting
is not equivalent to traditional voting. Not only
that, all electronic voting actually
increases the
risks of errors and tampering . The risks can be
controlled by the use of a
voter-verified audit
trail.
The material on this page examines the arguments in plain terms but
offers links to fuller, more detailed documentation elsewhere.
The Traditional Ballot
With a traditional ballot, the voter is the person that makes the
recording of their vote. This is typically a mark or marks on a
ballot paper. These are physical marks that can be directly confirmed by
the voter themselves, i.e. implicit in the traditional ballot is
the process of
voter verification. The
voter can directly verify that the recording of their vote is in
keeping with their intentions. The voter is also responsible for
depositing the ballot paper into a ballot box - thus ensuring that
the ballot is not read or interfered with before being
deposited.
Electronic Voting - A Third Party
With a purely electronic voting system, the voter
presses buttons (or their equivalent) corresponding to their voting
choice and the electronic system records the vote. The voter cannot
directly see the recording of the vote but is assured that the vote
is recorded and stored accurately by the machine. This process is
manifestly different to that of the
traditional vote - a
third party has been introduced in the form of
the machine. The machine records the vote, assures the voter that
the recording is accurate and notionally places it in the ballot
box. We only have it on trust that this is done correctly.
Most voters would find being forced to hand over their traditional
ballot paper to a third party as being unacceptable but yet this is
what happens with electronic voting without voter-verification. Where
previously there was nothing preventing the voter from directly
verifying their vote, now they are
forced to trust
an intermediate.
The fact that the intermediate is a machine may assure some people
however machines can fail and without direct verification there is
always the risk that a failure will go unnoticed until it is too
late. Moreover machines are made and tested by people who make
mistakes and are corruptible. Someone has to vouch for the machines
and it is they that are ultimately taking your vote and assuring
you that it is safe in their hands. The voter has never been forced
to blindly trust anyone before so why start now ?
Detecting Failure or Fraud
Without an independent, voter-verified audit trail it
is impossible to judge if the outcome of an electronic ballot is
accurate. Accuracy can only be measured in comparison to something
and without knowing what the voter's intentions were one cannot
say. Even if the system was tested originally with a trail in place,
there has to be a mechanism for detecting subsequent failure or
fraud or anything else that could affect the accuracy of the
result.
References
Voter Verified Audit Trails
E-voting Errors, Fraud, Tampering etc.
Ireland & E-voting in 2004
Civil Rights & E-Voting